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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16668

-vsALFRED WILLIAM JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with and convicted of burglary,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 766-202 (1953, as amended).
DISPOSITIOtl IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant, Alfred William Johnson, was tried before
a jury in the Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable
James S. Sawaya, Judge, presiding.
of guilty.

The jury returned a verdict

The court sentenced the appellant to serve the

indeterminate term as provided by law of not less than one
nor more than fifteen years at the Utah State Prison.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the verdict of
guilty rendered by the jury below.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At trial the victim, Richard Ball, testified
that on return to his apartment, located at Snowbird Ski
Resort, Salt Lake County, he found the appellant inside
(T .11) .

Mr.

Ball testified that all doors to his apartment

were locked when he left at 10: 10 a.m. and that he was the
only person with a key (T.17,18).

He noted that a screen

which was intact when he left two hours earlier now had
a "L" shaped cut in it (T.12,17).
The victim noticed that a security box which

h~

a hidden 1ock had been moved from its normal resting place
at the head of the bed to the center of the bed (T.11,18).
The hidden lock, which was exposable onlv bv slidin~ a
oiece on the bottom of the box was now exposed (T.19).
Mr. Ball asked the appellant what he was dbing in his ro~
and was told that he was "looking for a way out" (T.12,25).
When Mr. Ball continued to question the appellant he was tole
that the appellant was a guest who was staying upstairs
(T.12,13).

Mr. Ball called the front desk to verify the

appellant's story.

Meanwhile the appellant made his way to

the door and then left Richard Ball's apartment (T.13 ,2 6) ·
·
iona
Mr. Ball followed the appellant who broke into a J09 a
~
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a narrow foot path and a full fledged run when he reached
the parking lot (T.14).
Richard Ball was able to take down the appellant's
license plate number which he reported to Snowbird
security (T.15).
The appellant was apprehended by Officer Chard
at 1250 East on 6800 South (T.37), and later was positively
identified by Richard Ball (T.16).
During cross-examination of arresting officer
Chard, appellant's counsel attempted to elicit a statement
made by the appellant (T.39).

The prosecution objected

on the ground that the statement would be hearsay and the
trial court sustained the objection (T.39).

When appellant's

counsel contested the ruling of the judge the jury was
dismissed and the issue was argued (T.40-45).

At that time

appellant's counsel directed the court solely to Rule 63(6)
of the Utah Rules of Evidence (T.40).

The trial court

rejected the appellant's construction of Rule 63(6) and
ruled that the appellant's statement was self-serving and
not admissible as a confession or admission (T.45).
The appellant requested that an instruction on
the lesser offense of criminal trespass be given.

The

trial court refused and the appellant took exception (T.75) •
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING
ANY EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE WHICH
WAS NOT TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT BELOW.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred
in excluding his hearsay statement because it falls under at
least one of five exceptions to the hearsay rule (Appellant's
brief at p. 4).

This general contention should fail because

the only exception which is properly before this Court on
appeal is Rule 63(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, which
was timely raised by the appellant at trial as the sole
basis for admitting the hearsay statement of the appellant.
The transcript reveals that the appellant's attorney
attempted to solicit a hearsay statement from the arresting
police officer.

The prosecution objected to introduction

of the conversation on the grounds that it was hearsay, a~
the court sustained the objection (T.39).
The appellant contested the court's ruling and
the issue was discussed out of the presence of the jury
(T.40).

The appellant directed the court to Rule 63(6)

as the exception which justified admission of the appellant's
hearsay statement (T.40).
Appellant is now raising for the first time on

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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appeal the applicability of the following additional
exceptions:

Rule 63(12) {a), statement of Physical or

Mental Condition of the Declarant; Rule 63(7) Admission

by Parties; Rule 63(10) Declaration Against Interest;
and Rule 63(4) (b) Contemporaneous Statements.

Normally

this Court will not consider an issue for the first time
on appeal.

In Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24

Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970), this Court said:
Orderly procedure, whose
proper purpose is the final
settlement of controversies, requires
that a party must present his entire
case and his theory or theories of
recovery to the trial court; and having
done so, he cannot thereafter chanae
to some different theory and thus ~
attempt to keep in motion a merry-goround of litigation.
470 P.2d at 401.

See also:

State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d

160, 499 P.2d 846 (1972); State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah
2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965).
Allowing the appellant to raise new issues on
appeal which were not raised in the court below is not
appropriate in this case.

Here the appellant contends that

the trial court erred in not allowing the hearsay statement
of the appellant to come into evidence because it falls under
one of five exceptions to the hearsay rule.

In light of

the fact that appellant directed the court to that specific

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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exception which he felt allowed the hearsay statement to
come into evidence the appellant should not, after failing
below on one theory be allowed to change his theory on
appeal, and thus "keep the merry-go-round of litigation
in motion."

Simpson, supra.

Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible
unless they fall within one of the defined exceptions to
the hearsay rule.

By directing the court to Rule 63(6),

the appellant was in fact attempting to define the limited
scope of the use of the proffered statement in accordance
with Rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which provides:
When relevant evidence is admissible as
to one party or for one purpose and is
inadmissible as to other parties or for
another purpose, the judge upon request
shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and instruct the jury accordingly.
The appellant's attempt to define an admissible
use of an otherwise inadmissible hearsay statement failed
and the appellant should be precluded from raising new
theories of admissibility on appeal.

-6-
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING
APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT.
The trial court was correct in excluding the
appellant's hearsay statement because it did not fall
within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule.
"Hearsay statements have been generally discredited because
they (1)

lack trustworthiness and (2) the person purporting

to know the facts is not stating them under oath."
In Re K.D.S., 578 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah 1978).

State

Exceptions to

the hearsay rule are enumerated in Rule 63 of the Utah
Rules of Evidence.

In this case the appellant attempted

to introduce his exculpatory statement without taking the
stand to avoid cross-examination by the prosecution about
his prior convictions for burglary.

The judge was correct

in excluding the hearsay statement because it lacked
trustworthiness and was to be introduced to keep the appellant
from being cross-examined under oath, thus this case falls
within the scope of statements which should be excluded
under the authority of State In Re K.D.S., supra.
A.
THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS NOT
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63(12) (a) AS A
STATEMENT OF THE MENTAL CONDITION OF THE
DECLARAN'T.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

As stated earlier, this issue is not properly
before this Court on appeal since it was not raised in
the trial court.

However, if this Court decides to examine

this issue, the record below indicates that the appellant's
hearsay statement does not fall within the statement of
mental condition exception to the hearsay rule which
states:
Unless the judge finds it was made in
bad faith, a statement of the declarant's
(a) then existing state of mind, emotion
or physical sensation, including statments
of intent, plan, motive, design, mental
feeling, pain and bodily health, but not
including memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed, when such a
mental or physical condition is an issue
or is relevant to prove or explain acts
or conduct of the declarant.
Rule 63(12) (a), Utah Rules of Evidence.
Since this issue was not raised below the trial court was
not given an opportunity to make a specific finding on
whether the statement was in bad faith.

On appeal this

Court should affirm the trial court if the record discloses
that the proper legal ground existed even if it was not
stated by the trial court.

Edwards v. Iron County, 531 P.ld

476 (Utah 1975); Foss Lewis & Sons Const. Co. v. General
Insurance co. of America, 30 Utah 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539 (19
In examining the discussion that occurred out
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731

of the presence of the jury, the record indicates that
the judge implicitly ruled that the appellant's statement
was in bad faith.

The court characterized the attempt of

the appellant by stating:
~\That

you are trying to do and I can
tell you right now is, you are trying
to get his excuse before this jury
without putting him on the stand to
say it and I'm not going to let you do
it.

(T. 42).

The reasoning of the trial court is mirrored by the
Washington Court of Appeals in dealing with a case similar
to this one.
299

In State v. Smith, 15 Wash.App. 103, 547 P.2d

(1976), the defendant appealed from a conviction of

two charges of taking a motor vehicle without the permission
of the owner.

The defendant contested the exclusion of

hearsay testimony as to defendant's intoxicated state at
the time of making a confession.

The appellate court

sustained the exclusion as proper and not within the state
of physical and mental condition exception to the hearsay
rule because:
The statements were self serving and their
admission would have avoided cross-examination
at trial and circumvented the purpose of
Cr.R. 3.5.
547 P.2d at 302.
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Here as there, the "self-serving characterization" is
sufficient to establish that the statement does not come
within the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule.
The only significant obstacle to the admission
of state of mind declarations is that of willful
misrepresentations which can be overcome if the court
finds that the declaration was given under circumstances
showing no apparent motive for the speaker to falsify.
1977 Utah Law Review 85, 88.

The judge's ruling indicates

doubt of the lack of motive to falsify.

The appellant's

"admission" consisted of confirming the fact that he had
been at Snowbird, a fact which could not be denied because
appellant knew that an eyewitness could identify him,
and an exculpatory statement which was given to the
arresting police officer and thus lacked the verity that
accompanies statements to independent third parties.
The cases cited by the appellant are not determinative in this case.

In State v. Simmons, 573 P.2d 341

(Utah 1977) , the statement which the defendant had attempted·.
introduce was not similar in character to the one in this
case because there the defendant made the statement to
an independent third person.

Here the defendant had just

fled from the scene of the burglary and knew that an

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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eye-witness could identify him.

Even if the statement

was admissible under Rule 63(12) (a), failure to admit
the statement would not be prejudicial error according
to Simmons, supra.
State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977) is
totally inapplicable because there the statements which
the prosecution attempted to introduce were statements of
the victim in a homicide case which were not relevant
because the victim's state of mind is not in question in
a homicide case.
The record is sufficient to establish that the
statement was hearsay which was not made in good faith and
thus the trial court did not commit error in excluding it
since it did not come within Rule 63(12) (a) as an exception
to the hearsay rule.
B
THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS NOT
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63(6) AS A CONFESSION
OR ADMISSION.
The record indicates that the judge made a ruling
which specifically determined that the hearsay statement
which the appellant wished to introduce was not a confession
or admission.

The appellant contends that the statement

established that the appellant was at Snowbird, but that he

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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did not possess the intent to commit burglary.

Such in

and of itself does not, as appellant claims, establish
that appellant could be convicted of criminal trespass.
The appellant's statement not only denies intent to commit
theft, but also fails to suggest that appellant possessed

_,

the intent to commit criminal trespass (See Point III, infra
Since the statement would not be a basis upon which the
appellant could be convicted of criminal trespass it is
not an admission as claimed by the appellant.
Rule 63(6) provides:
In a criminal proceeding as against
the accused, a previous statement by him
relative to the offense charged if, and
only if, the judge finds that the statement was made knowingly and voluntarily
by the accused and the circumstances
under which the statement was made were
not violative of the constitutional
rights of the accused.
The appellant conceded that the statement is
a confession (T.41)

n~

thus on appeal this Court need only

decide whether the trial court was correct in refusing to
sustain appellant's claim that his statement was less iliG
a full confession and thus equal to an admission.
The trial court characterized the statement as
"not a proper admission or confession but an excuse for
why he was there"

(T.41).
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What you are trying to elicit is a
statement, I'm sure, that says: "I admit
I was there but I wasn't there with the
intent of committing any crime."
Now, that's not an admission and that's
not against his interest.

That's a self-

serving statement and it loses the character of truthfulness that the admission
that the exception contemplates and has
been permitted for all these hundreds of
years.
The reason for this exception is because
the law says a man is not going to say
something against his own interest unless
it's true.
(T. 44) .
The court found that the appellant's construction of Rule
63(6) would "contemplate allowing anything that the accused
says to come in regardless of whether it's an admission or
not .

." (T.45) and ruled that that was not the proper

construction of Rule 63(6) and thus the appellant's statement
was not admissible because it was not an admission against
the appellant's interest but was simply a self-serving
exculpatory statement.

c
THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS
NOT AD!1ISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63 ( 7) AS AN
ADMISSIO!' BY A PARTY.
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Respondent submits that this issue is not proper)y
before this Court on appeal since it was not raised in t~
trial court.

However, if this Court decides to examine this

issue the record demonstrates that the appellant's hears~
statement does not fall within Rule 63(7) which provides:
As against himself a statement by a
person who is a party to the action in
his individual or a representative
capacity and, if the latter, who was
acting in such representative capacity
in making the statement;

J. Maughan. concurrina in State In Re K.D.S, supra at 13
noted that this exception only applies in civil cases.

This

matter is not a civil case and this exception is inapplicabi:.
Even if this exception applied in criminal cases
it is clearly not applicable to this case because it states
that "as against himself" a statement is admissible.
appellant's statement is not against himself, it is

The
s~p~

an exculpatory statement which does not create any basis
upon which the appellant could be admitting to the lesser
crime of criminal trespass.
The cases cited by appellant, State In Re K.D.S,
and Watters v. Querry, 588 P.2d 702 (Utah 1978)
support the interpretation of Rule 63(7) as applying only
to civil cases, thus the trial court did not err in excludinc
the hearsay statement.
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D

THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS
NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63 (10) AS A
DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST.
Again, this issue is not properly before this
court on appeal since it was not raised in the trial court.
However if this Court decides to examine this issue the
record clearly indicates that the appellant's hearsay
statement does not fall within the declaration against
interest exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 63(10) which
provides:
Subject to the limitations of exception
(6), a statement which the judge finds was
made by a declarant who is unavailable as
a witness and which was at the time of the
assertion so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest or so far
subjected him to civil or criminal liability
or so far rendered invalid a claim by him
against another or created such risk of
making him an object of hatred, ridicule
or social disapproval that the declarant
under the circumstances existing would not
have made the statement unless he believed
it to be true;
In order to establish that the appellant's hearsay
statement was admissible as a declaration against interest
the appellant must show that (1)

the declarant was unavailable,

(2) the statement was against his pecuniary or proprietary
interest or so far subjected him to civil or criminal liability,
and (3)

the declarant would not have made the statement
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unless it were true.

The appellant cannot show that any

of these requirements are present in this case.
In the present case the appellant claims that
by exercising his priviledge against self incrimination
he was unavailable as a witness.

In State v. Smith, supra,

the defendant made a similar claim.

The trial court

rejected that claim and the appellate court affirmed
statinq:
Here the defendant chose not to
testify at trial.
This does not
constitute a sufficient showing
of unavailability to allow introduction of a defendant's former
testimony.
Unavailability, for
purposes of the hearsay exception,
must be "without the connivance of
the party seeking to introduce the
testimony" of the absent witness.
State v. Ortego, supra, 22 wash.2d
at 564, 157 P.2d at 326. A defendant
responsible for his own absence or
unavailability cannot be considered
unavailable for purposes of introducing his prior testimony.
State
v. Small, 20 N.C.App. 423, 201 S.E.
2d 584 (1974)
547 P.2d 299, 301.
Although Rule 62 (7) (a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence includes
exception of a witness on the grounds of priviledge as a
situation constituting unavailability this Court should
follow State v. Smith, and not allow a defendant to manipulat:
the hearsay exceptions and connive

unavailability in order
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to avoid cross-examination about prior convictions.
Even if the appellant is allowed to claim
unavailability based on his priviledge against self
incrimination he failed to establish that his statement
was against pecuniary or proprietary interest or such as
to subject him to civil or criminal liability.

Appellant

contends that the statement would subject him to criminal
liability, in that it was an admission of criminal
trespass.

As noted below (See point III, infra) there

was never any foundation whereby the appellant could be
convicted of criminal trespass thus the statement was
not one which would subject him to criminal liability.
In fact,

the statement, as characterized by the court

below (T.41) was merely an "excuse" for his presence,
which could not be denied because there was an eye
witness.
Finally, even if appellant had established that
the statement was such as to subject him to criminal
liability the circumstances under which the statement was
made are not condusive to showing that the appellant would
not have made the statement unless it were true.

The

appellant had been caught "red handed" in the victim's
room and he knew that he could be identified.

This

knowledge may have prompted the appellant to state to the
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arresting officer that he was at Snowbird, since denial
would be useless.

Apparently the appellant also stated

that he did not intend to take anything from the apartment
in which he was found.

Such a statement lacks the credibifr

present in statements to third parties, or those which tend
to implicate an individual in a crime.

The circumstances

of the appellant's statement distinguish it from those
which were intended by this exception to the hearsay rule,
The appellant failed to demonstrate any basis
upon which Rule 63(10) could apply to his statement and
the trial court did not err in excluding the hearsay
statement.
E

THE APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT WAS
NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 63(4) (b) AS
A CONTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT.
This issue is not properly before this Court on
appeal since it was not raised in the trial court.

However,

even if this Court decides to examine this issue it is clear
that the appellant's proffered statement does not fall
within Rule 63 (4) (b)

contemporaneous statement exception

to the hearsay rule which states:
A statement (a) which the judge finds was
made while the declarant was perceiving
the event or condition which the statement
narrates, describes or explains, or
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(b) which the judge finds was made
while the declarant was under the
stress of a nervous excitement caused
by such perception.
The facts of this case indicate that the statement in
question was not made contemporaneous to the event in
question.

In this case the statement was made after the

appellant had left the apartment, and the canyon.

He was

traveling in the valley when he was apprehended by the
police officer.
State v. McMillan, 588 P.2d 162 (Utah 1978)
cited by the appellant estab1ishes that this statement
was not within the contemporaneous statement exception,
quoting Johnston v. Ohls, 76 Wash.2d 398, 457 P.2d 194
(1969), this Court described the nature of this exception
to the hearsay rule:
The crucial question in all cases is
whether the statement was made while
the declarant was still under the
influence of the event to the extent
that his statement could not be the
result of fabrication, intervening
actions, or the exercise of choice or
judgment.
State v. McMillan, supra, at 163.
In McMillan the Court found that the statement by
a child, made minutes after the event had occurred would
not be subject to fabrication.

In this case the appellant,
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who was not a child, was able to reflect upon the
situation from the time he ran from Richard Ball's room
at Snowbird until he reached the Salt Lake Valley where
he was arrested.
This case clearly falls within State v. Sanders,
27 Utah 2d 354, 496 P.2d 270 (1972) where the Court fou~
that the nervous excitement necessary to establish this
exception to the hearsay rule was not present where the
co-defendant made a statement implicating himself and
three others after the commission of the robbery.

There

as here the act of which the appellant was charged had
been completed.
If the appellant was under any nervous stress
it was that which accompanied his arrest and not that which
could be associated to the "burglary."

Therefore the

appellant's statement did not fall within the

conternpor~~m

statement exception and the trial court did not err in
excluding it.
F

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN EXCLUDING
APPELLANT'S HEARSAY STATEMENT, AND EVEN
IF ERROR OCCURRED IT WAS HARMLESS.
Respondent submits that only Rule 63 (6) is properl
before this Court on appeal because the appellant failed
to timely raise other exceptions to the hearsay rule in t~
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court below.

However, as shown in A through E above, the

appellant's statement was not admissible under any of the
hearsay exceptions and the trial court was correct in
excluding the evidence.
Assur.1ing arguendo, that the evidence was admissible
under any one of the hearsay exceptions noted by the appellant
failure to admit that evidence was not prejudicial.

In order

to reverse a verdict based on the erroneous exclusion of
evidence two things must be shown, as described in Rule
5 of the Utah Rules of Evidence:
A verdict or finding shall not be set
aside, nor shall the judgment or decision
based thereon be reversed, by reason of the
erroneous exclusion of evidence unless (a)
it appears of record that the proponent of
the evidence either made known the substance
of the evidence in a form and by a method
approved by the judge, or indicated the substance of the expected evidence by questions
indicating the desired answers, and (b) the
court which passes upon the effect of the
error or errors is of the opinion that the
excluded evidence would probably have had a
substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict or finding.
In State v. Simmons, supra, upon finding that the
excluded hearsay statement was admissible this Court stated
that:
We must review alleged error in conformity with 77-42-1, U.C.A.1953, ~nd
may not interfere with a jury verdict,
unless upon review of the entire record,
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there emerges error of sufficient
gravity to indicate defendant's
rights were prejudiced, in a substantial manner. There must be a
reasonable probability there would
have been a result more favorable
to defendant, in the absence of
error.
The alleged error in this case is not of sufficient
gravity to indicate that defendant's rights were

prejudic~.

In view of the fact that the statement would have been
admitted had the appellant wished to take the stand the
trial court did not substantially impair appellants rights
by excluding the statement.

In addition there must be a

reasonable probability that there would have been a result
more favorable to the defendant, as discussed below (See
Point III, infra)

the appellant could not establish intent

to merely commit criminal trespass, based on the evidence
he was either guilty of burglary or not guilty at all.
Thus, there is not a reasonable probability that the
verdict would have been different and this Court should
not reverse appellant's conviction.
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POINT III
CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS NOT A NECESSARILY
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY AND
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO INSTRUCT ON CRIMINAL TRESPASS.
Appellant contends that criminal trespass, Utah
Code Ann.

§

76-6-206 (1953, as amended), is a necessarily

included offense of burglary, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201
(1953, as amended), and because he requested an instruction
on the lesser crime the trial court's refusal to so instruct
constitutes reversible error.
Both the premise and conclusion of appellant's
contention are erroneous and do not compel reversal of
the jury verdict.

Under the facts of this case and the

law regarding the giving of requested instructions the
trial court ruled oroperlv and no reversible error occurred.

A
THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
HAS A RIGHT TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY
OF THE CASE TO THE JURY IN THE
INSTRUCTIONS ONLY UNDER PROPER
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Respondent does not dispute the basic premise
that a defendant in a criminal case should be allowed to
present his theory of the case to the jury.

However, in

State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), this Court

-23Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

recognized that "the right is not absolute, and a defense
theory must be supported by a certain quantum of evidence
before an instruction as to an included offense need be
given."

Because the right is not unlimited the trial

court is not necessarily bound to give all instructions
relating to defense theories just because they are
requested or because they are characterized by the defendant
as reflecting his theory of the case.
Therefore, if a defendant's theory of the case is
all theory and no evidence or so unreasonable based on the
evidence presented that it does not satisfy the requirements
of a defense, no instruction thereon is required.
Code Ann. § 76-2-201, et seq.

See Utah

(1953), as amended.

In support of his claim that a defendant's theory
of the case must be instructed upon, appellant cites
State v. Gillian, 23 Utah 2d 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970), fur
the proposition that "when the accused as his theory of the
case requests instructions on lesser included offenses · ·
the trial court as a general rule is duty bound to submit
these alternatives to the trier of the fact" {appellant's
brief, p.22).
The appellant admits that this general rule is
limited to situations where the defendant's argument is
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that he is not guilty of the crime as charged and he is
guilty of some lesser charge.

A situation which does not

factually exist in the present case (See IIIC below) •
Gillian was a first degree murder trial where substantial
evidence of criminal homicide other than first degree
murder was presented and this Court found that the trial
court's failure to so instruct was reversible error.
Gillian does not mean that any defense theory is a basis
for a requested instruction on lesser offenses.

The theory

must be based on reasonable (even substantial) evidence
before an instruction on a lesser included offense is
mandated.
The lesson of Gillian is that on review this Court
must look at the facts of the case to determine the validity
of the trial court's rejection of proposed instructions.
Because a defendant characterizes certain evidence as a
defense theory and requests instructions thereon, does not
mean that the trial court, or a reviewing court, must adopt
that characterization when the evidence presents a theory
different than that which the defendant propounds.

In this

case the evidence presented does not support the defendant's
theory of criminal trespass and the trial court was correct
in refusing to instruct thereon.
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B

CRIMINAL TRESPASS IS NOT NECESSARILY
A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF BURGLARY.
In State v. Hendricks, 596 P.2d 633 (Utah 1979),
this Court examined the question of whether criminal
trespass is a lesser included offense of burglary and found
that it is not.

In that case the defendant charged with

burglary raised the defense of voluntary intoxication and
requested an instruction on criminal trespass which was
denied.

On appeal this Court sustained the trial court's

refusal to give the instruction on criminal trespass

bec~H

"the evidence (including that presented by the defendant),
established all of the elements of burglary but did not
establish all of the elements of criminal trespass."
634.

Id. at

Contrary to the appellant's assertion, this holding

indicates that this Court found that criminal trespass is
not necessarily a lesser included offense of burglary.

The

meaning is clear when footnote 6 which follows this Statement
is analyzed.

In that footnote the Court states that, "Such

in and of itself precludes the giving of the requested
instructions.
see:

As to what constitutes an included offense

State v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23,

33 P. 2d 640 (1934)' and

State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 195, 371 P.2d 27 (1962)."
The standards under which the Court determined that
·de·
the instruction on criminal trespass was precluded provi ·
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The statute allows conviction for
lesser offense necessarily included
in the offense charged in the indictment or
information, but does not allow conviction
of any lesser offense stated in the indictment
unless it is necessarily included in the
greater offense.
The lesser offense must be
a necessary element of the greater offense and
must of necessity be embraced within the legal
definition of the greter offense and be a
part thereof.
~ny

33 P.2d at 645

(emphasis by Court, added).

The rule as to when one offense
is included in another is that the greater
offense includes a lesser one when establishment of the greater would necessarily include
proof of all the elements necessary to prove
the lesser.
Conversely, it is only when the
proof of the lesse·r offense requires some
element not involved in the greater offense
that the lesser would not be an included
offense.
371 P.2d at 29

(emphasis added).

Since the evidence established all the elements of
burglary but did not establish all the elements of criminal
trespass it is clear that "the lesser offense requires some
element not involved in the greater offense" and thus criminal
trespass is not a lesser included offense of burglary.
This conclusion was not reversed in the recent case
of State v. Brooks,

P.2d

, Sup. Ct. No. 16729, May

28, 1981 (Utah), where this Court affirmed the trial court's
refusal to grant defendant's motion to reduce the charge from
burglary to criminal trespass.

In that case this Court's

discussion of the issue centered on the proof of the
defendant's intent to commit a theft because as a matter of
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of law the trial court would not have been correct if t~
evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for
burglary.

This Court ultimately decided that there was

enough evidence to submit the question to the jury.

In

Brooks, this Court did not state that criminal trespass
is a lesser included offense of burglary and thus followed
the holding of Hendricks, supra, which remains the law.
A comparison of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-202,
burglary, and 76-6-206, criminal trespass, confirms that
criminal trespass requires proof of elements not involved
in burglary.

Therefore under the test of Woolman and

Brennan, supra, criminal trespass is not a necessarily
lesser included offense of burglary.

Section 76-6-202 provL

(1) A person is guilty of burglary if
he enters or remains unlawfully in a building
or any portion of a building with intent to
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault
on any person.
(2)
Burlgary is a felony of the third
degree unless it was committed in a dwelling,
in which event it is a felony of the second
degree.
Section 76-6-206 provides:
( 1)
For purposes of ht is section 'enter'
means intrusion of the entire body.
(2) A person is guilty of criminal
trespass if, under circumstances not
.
amounting to burglary as defined in sections
76-6-202, 76-6-203, or 76-6-204:
(a)
He enters or remains unlawfully on
property and:
· · ry
(i)
Intends to cause annoyance or inJU
to any person thereon or damage to any property
thereon; or
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(ii)
Intends to commit any crime,
other than theft or a felony;
(iii)
Is reckless as to whether his
presence will cause fear for the safety
of another.
(b)
Knowing his entry or presence
is unlaw~ul, he.enters.or remains on property
as to which notice against entering is given
by:
(i)
Personal communication to the
actor by the owner or someone with apparent
authority to act for the owner; or
(ii)
Fencing or other enclosure obviously
designed to exclude intruders; or
(iii)
Posting of signs reasonably likely
to come to the attention of the intruders.
(3)
A violation of subsection (2) (a)
is a class C misdemeanor unless it was committed
in a dwelling, in which event it is a class B
misdemeanor. A violation of subsection (2) (b)
is an infraction.
(4)
It is a defense to prosecution under
this section:
(a)
That the property was open to the
public when the actor entered or remained; and
(b)
The actor's conduct did not
substantially interfere with the owner's use
of the property.
To prove criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor,
the state must show that the actor entered or remained on
property and had specific intent to do certain things or be
reckless about the effect of his presence.
To prove criminal trespass, an infraction, the
state must show that the actor knowing his entry or presence
was unlawful, entered or remained on property despite
certain kinds of notice being given.
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Burglary requires unlawful entry in a building
with the intent to conunit a felony, theft or assault.
To prove criminal trespass, a class C misdemeanor,
requires showing specific intent different than the intent
to conunit theft, assault or other felony, Brennan, Id.
The elements of specific intent required for criminal
trespass, a class C misdemeanor, are not necessary elements
of burglary, Woolman, supra.

Proof of the elements of

burlgary does not "necessarily include proof of all the
elements necessary to prove the lesser" crime of criminal
trespass, Brennan, supra, and therefore no instruction
thereon was mandated.
Criminal trespass, an infraction, is likewise
not necessarily established by proof of burglary.

It

requires certain kinds of notice against entry before its
sanctions apply.
In conclusion, the cases cited by appellant W
support his theory that criminal trespass in Utah is a lesser
included offense of burglary, Day v.
S.W.2d 302

(1976); People v.

State, Tex. Cr., 532

Henderson, 41 N.Y.2d 233, 359

N.E. 2d 1357 (1976); and Commonwealth v. Carter, 344 A.2d 89~
(Pa. 1975), are distinguishable.
In Day v. State, supra, the criminal trespass
statute is significantly different than our statute.
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The

Texas statute does not contain any of the specific intent
provisions of Section 76-6-206(2) (a).

The better view of

subsection (2) (b), is that notice against entry must be
more than a building itself and the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals incorrectly construed that element of criminal
trespass.

Moreover, the test for giving lesser included

instructions is less rigorous in Texas than in Utah and an
instruction thereon in Texas may have been obligatory.
The criminal trespass statute in People v.
Henderson, supra, is also dissimilar to Utah's statute.
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York Ann., Book 39,
§§

140.05, 140.10, reveal that no specific intent element

exists in the New York statute.

New York has eliminated

the word "obviously" from its approximate analog of
Section 76-6-206(2) (b) and does not include an explicit
notice requirement as exists in Utah's statute.
Commonwealth v. Carter, supra, indicates that
Pennsylvania's criminal trespass statute proscribes only
unlicensed or unprivileged entry into a building or occupied
structure.

344 A.2d 901.

Thus, the elements of intent

present in Section 76-6-206(2) (a) and the element of notice
present in Section 76-6-206(2) (b) are absent from the
Pennsylvania statute.

Furthermore, the Pennsylvania statute

is limited to buildings and structures, a more narrow term
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than the broad "property" language of Section 76-6-206.
For the reasons cited above it is clear that er~
trespass is not a lesser included offense of burglary and t'
trial court was correct in refusing to grant the appellant',
requested instruction on criminal trespass.

c
THE LOWER COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON CRIMINAL
TRESPASS.
Respondent submits that State v. Hendricks, 596
P.2d 633 (Utah 1979), has determined that criminal trespass
is not a lesser included offense of burglary and therefore
the trial judge was correct in refusing to give an instruct·
on criminal trespass.

However, if this Court now determines

that criminal trespass is a lesser included offense of
burglary, an instruction thereon was not required by the la•
in Utah,concerning instructions on lesser offenses, on t~
facts of this case.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-33-6 (1953), as amended, whid
appellant cites as imposing on the court an obligation to
give an instruction on the lesser included offense, reads:
The jury may find the defendant guilty
of any offense the corrunission of which is
necessarily included in that wit~ which ~e
is charged in the indictment or information,
or of an attempt to corrunit the offense.
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According to State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah
1978).

This section is governed by Utah Code Ann. §

76-1-402 (4)

(1953), as amended, under which:

The court shall not be obligated
to charge the jury with respect to an
included offense unless there is a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting
the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense:(Emphasis added.)
This statute codifies common law principles dating back to
territorial days, People v. Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21 P.2d
403

(1889).
In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976),

the defendant was convicted of the crime of unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance.

He

appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in refusing
to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of
possession of a controlled substance.

In affirming the

conviction, this Honorable Court held that where defense
testimony could prove only complete innocence, the defendant
was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included
offense.
P.2d 592

This Court, citing Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 183, 414
(1966), also enunciated the three situations in

which the question of whether to instruct on lesser included
offenses are frequently encountered:
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. . First, where there is evidence
which would absolve the defendant from
guilt of a greater offense, or degree,
but would support a finding of guilt of
a--Iesser offense, or degree; the instruction is mandatory.
Second, where the evidence would not
support a finding of guilt in the commission
of the lesser offense or degree. For
example, the defendant denies any complicity
in the crime charged, and thus lays no
foundation for any intermediate verdict, or
where the elements of the offense differ,
and some element essential to the lesser
offense is either not proved or shown not
to exist.
This second situation renders an
instruction on a lesser included offense
erroneous, because it is ~~t pertinent.
Third, is an intermediate situation.
One where the elements of the greater offense
include all the elements of the lesser offense;
because, by its very nature, the greater
offense could not have been committed without
defendant having the intent in doing the acts,
which constitute the lesser offense.
In such
a situation instructions on the lesser includ~
offense may be given because all elements of the
lesser offense have been proved.
Ho;:c·Jer, such
an instruction may properly be refUS"E~ if the
prosecution has met its burden of proof of t~
greater offense, and there is no evidence
tending to reduce the greater offense.
550 P.2d at 176, 177 (emphasis added).

This was

affirm~~

State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, 1355 (Utah 1977), and~
v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1977).
In the present case, the evidence presented by
the appellant falls under the second situation cited above,
in which an instruction on a lesser included offense is not
appropriate at all.

The defendant failed to establish ~~
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any basis for a conviction of criminal trespass existed.
Appellant's characterization of his theory as justifying an
instruction on criminal trespass misrepresents his own
evidence.

His statements as to "looking for a way out" and

"being a guest upstairs" if believed would have eliminated
all criminal intent and there would have been no basis for
a conviction on criminal trespass.
trespass,

a

As noted above, criminal

class C misdemeanor, requires specific intent

to do certain things or be reckless about the effect of
his presence.

The appellant failed to show that his actions

could be the basis of a class C misdemeanor conviction.
Similarly, the appellant's theory also eliminates intent
to commit criminal trespass, an infraction, which requires
some showing that the actor knowing his entry or presence was
unlawful, entered or remained on property despite certain
kinds of notice being given.

If as the appellant characterizes

the evidence the screen was cut open by someone besides the
appellant the type of notice which is required to be given
under criminal trespass an infraction would not have existed.
Thus,

"some element essential to the lesser offenses is

either not proved or shown not to exist."

Dougherty, supra,

at 176, and the trial court was correct in refusing to give the
requested instruction on criminal trespass.
The facts suggest that appellant was either guilty
of burglary or not guilty of any crime.

Even if the appellant's

version of the story was in fact the case and the jury was
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stand either for the greater offense of burglary or for fr
"alleged"

le s s er inc
· 1 u d e d o ff ense of criminal trespass.

Thus, the case falls directly under the guidelines of
State v. Dougherty, supra, where the Court declared, "The
defense testimony could only prove complete innocence. 11
There, as here, the appellant tried to proceed on a
lesser included offense theory which was rejected by this
Court:
. . Such a theory is not
available to him where the record
shows he could only be found guilty
or not guilty of the crime charged.
550 P.2d at 177.
It can be said, therefore, that under Utah
Ann. § 76-1-402 (4)

C~e

(1953), as amended, the trial court in

the case at bar was not obliged to instruct as to an
included offense, because even though the jury may have
chosen to believe the appellant, thereby acquitting him,
no evidentiary basis existed upon which a conviction of
criminal trespass could stand.

Since Utah Code Ann. §

76-1-402(4) is stated in the conjunctive, both statutory
requisites must be present before the trial court would be
required to instruct on the included offense.
The appellant also claims that this case is
similar to other cases in which the charge of burglary
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has been reduced to criminal trespass.

The cases cited

by appellant to support this proposition, Crawford v. state,
241 N.E.2d 795

(Ind. 1968); State v. Rood, 11 Ariz.App.

102, 462 P.2d 399

(1969), and State v. Kahinu, 53 Haw. 646,

500 P.2d 747 (1972), are factually distinguishable and support
the proposition that felonious intent in a burglary case
may be established by circumstantial evidence.
In Crawford v. State, supra, there was no evidence
that any property within the garage, where the defendant was
found hiding, had been removed in any way.

In addition there

were several broken windows through which the appellant could
have entered without using force.

Under these facts,. the

Court determined that the evidence was insufficient to support
a conviction of burglary beyond a reasonable doubt.

Thus, it

was insufficiency of the evidence and not the use of
circumstantial evidence which precluded the conviction.
In fact, the Court stated that, "We agree with the appellee
[state)

.

.

. that intent may be established by inference from

the circumstances surrounding an act."

Id. at 797.

In State v. Rood, supra, the facts of the case again
indicated that there was an unforceable entry into an unlocked
building.

Although this was insufficient to establish felonious

intent the court stated that, "The Arizona Supreme Court has
held that proof of intent can be shown by circumstantial

-37-
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evidence,"

Id. at 400, and "Criminal intent is usually

proven by circumstantial evidence."

Id. at 401.

Similarly in State v. Kanihu, supra, there was
evidence which tended to show that the room which the
appellant entered was unlocked.

Further evidence showed

that the room was previously occupied by the appellant's
girlfriend.

Finally,the appellant's flight from the rooo

was justified by evidence which showed that the appellant
was suffering from paranoia as a result of L.S.D.

All of

these factors led the court to find that the appellant
possess the requisite intent to commit burglary.

d~:

However,

the court recognized that:
Intent in a burglary case can be
established by inference from the
surrounding circumstances and accompanying
and attendant acts of the person accused.
Id. at 749.
The present case is clearly distinguishable from
Crawford, Rood, and Kanihu because the evidence upon which
the jury convicted the defendant, albeit circumstantial, wa'
sufficient to establish his intent.

Here, the appellant wa'

found in Richard Ball's apartment without authorization
there (T.11, 19).

to~

Entry was forcible through an "L" shaped

hole in the screen which was intact when the victim had lef:
his apartment two hours earlier (T.12, 17) ·

Al l doors toRi:

Ball's apartment were locked when he left at 10:10 a.m. and
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is the only one who possessed a key (T.17,18).

A "security

box" which had a hidden lock had been moved from its
normal resting place to the center of the victims bed with
the lock exposed (T.18,19).

The appellant jogged up a

narrow trail and then broke into a run as he reached the
parking lot, this was after Mr. Ball had attempted to verify
the appellant's story (T.12,13,14).

This evidence was

sufficient to establish that the appellant possessed the
intent to commit a theft when he entered the apartment of
Mr. Richard Ball, and also to distinguish this case from
State v. Brooks, supra.

As noted above circumstantial

evidence may be used to establish intent.

In State v. Burch,

17 Utah 2d 418, 413 P.2d 805 (1966), this Court affirmed a
second degree burglary conviction stating that circumstantial
evidence showing that the defendant was caught "red handed"
was sufficient to establish the defendant's intent.
Similarly, the circumstantial evidence which tended to show
that Richard Ball's security box had been tampered with while
the defendant was unlawfully located in Mr. Ball's apartment
was sufficient to establish felonious intent.

State v. Dusch,

17 Ariz.App. 286, 497 P.2d 402 (1972), states that felonious
intent can be inferred from unauthorized entry into a
building through a window.
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Appellant's attempt to create a defense theory
showing the necessary elements of criminal trespass does
not compel reversal.
In compliance with the facts here and State v.
Cornish, Utah, 568 P. 2d 360 (1977), the trial court proper!:
allowed the trier of fact to consider appellant's intent.
The jury could have believed the defendant and found no
intent to commit any crime and acquitted appellant, or the,,
j

could have believed the evidence presented by the sta~ ~
found the existence of the requisite conduct and inte~ ~
convicted appellant of burglary.
Appellant's conviction was valid and the trial
court correctly refused to give instructions on criminal
trespass.
CONCLUSION
It is a well established principle of law that an
appellate court will not review those issues which were not
timely raised in the trial court.

In this case appellant

has attempted to raise hearsay exceptions on appeal whi~
were not timely raised below.

Appellant should be preclude:

from raising any exception to the hearsay rule which was no:
timely raised in the trial court.
Assuming, arguendo, that the hearsay exceptions
which the appellant submits are reviewable on appeal they
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ft

do not apply to facts of this case and the trial court was
correct in excluding the self-serving hearsay statement of
the appellant.
Finally, the appellant's proffered instruction on
criminal trespass was properly rejected by the trial court
because in State v. Hendricks, supra, this Court determined
that criminal trespass is not a lesser included offense
of burglary.

Assuming arguendo,that criminal trespass was

a lesser included offense the facts of this case do not
require that the instruction be given since there is not a
basis upon which the appellant could be acquitted of the
greater crime and convicted of the lesser crime.

Under

appellant's theory of the case he was either guilty of
burglary or not guilty of any crime.
Appellant's conviction should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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